Risk for Infection with Highly Pathogenic Influenza A Virus (H5N1) in Chickens, Hong Kong, 2002 by Kung, Nina Y. et al.
We used epidemiologic evaluation, molecular epidemi-
ology, and a case-control study to identify possible risk fac-
tors for the spread of highly pathogenic avian influenza A
virus (subtype H5N1) in chicken farms during the first quar-
ter of 2002 in Hong Kong. Farm profiles, including stock
sources, farm management, and biosecurity measures,
were collected from 16 case and 46 control chicken farms
by using a pretested questionnaire and personal inter-
views. The risk for influenza A (H5N1) infection was
assessed by using adjusted odds ratios based on multivari-
ate logistic regression analysis. Retail marketing of live
poultry was implicated as the main source of exposure to
infection on chicken farms in Hong Kong during this period.
Infection control measures should be reviewed and upgrad-
ed as necessary to reduce the spread of influenza A
(H5N1) related to live poultry markets, which are common-
place across Asia.
T
he spread of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI)
type A virus (subtype H5N1) infection in poultry in
Asia and beyond poses threats to both human and animal
health. Attempts to control outbreaks of this disease in
poultry have become a regional and global priority (1,2).
However, little reliable epidemiologic data exist on routes
of virus transmission and perpetuation in poultry within
affected countries. 
Repeated outbreaks of HPAI (H5N1) outbreaks in
poultry occurred in farms and live poultry markets within
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region beginning
in 1997 (3–6). The first outbreak was associated with the
first recorded transmission of influenza A (H5N1) to
humans, with 18 cases and 6 deaths (7,8). These outbreaks
were controlled by slaughtering all poultry in all markets
and local farms and stopping all trading of live poultry for
7 weeks. No additional human cases were reported after
these interventions, and this particular genotype of influen-
za A (H5N1) virus has not been detected since (4).
No further outbreaks of influenza A(H5N1) in poultry
were recorded until 2001, when the virus was detected in
live poultry retail markets in Hong Kong. Poultry farms
were unaffected. This outbreak led to a slaughter of poul-
try in live poultry markets in Hong Kong. However, in
January 2002, influenza A (H5N1) was again detected in
Hong Kong wholesale and retail poultry markets (3,9).
Trace-back from the wholesale poultry market led to
detection of the virus on February 1, 2002, on a chicken
farm in a densely populated chicken farming area of the
New Territories area of Hong Kong. By late March, 17
chicken farms located within 2 km of the index farm, and
4 farms located within 2 to 5 km, were confirmed as infect-
ed (5,6). This outbreak was controlled by a combination of
depopulation of infected and contact farms, quarantine and
enhanced biosecurity, and vaccination (10). 
We report the results of an epidemiologic investiga-
tion of the 2002 outbreak, including a case-control study to
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Materials and Methods
Study Population
At the time of the 2002 outbreak, 146 commercial
chicken farms in Hong Kong were operating, with a com-
bined holding capacity of ≈3 million birds. These farms
supplied  ≈20% of the poultry consumed within Hong
Kong, with the remaining ≈80% imported from farms in
the nearby southern provinces of China. Land-based poul-
try shipments from both Hong Kong and China were usu-
ally delivered to 1 wholesale poultry market and then
resold to individual live poultry retail markets. Ducks and
geese that were reared on poultry farms in China and
imported by boat were delivered daily to a geographically
separate wholesale market for slaughter and sale as chilled
poultry in the live poultry markets. 
A cultural preference in Asian countries for freshly
killed poultry has resulted in a large volume of sales
through live poultry markets, with ≈850 retail poultry mar-
ket stalls in operation across Hong Kong. Several process
changes were introduced in 1998 to reduce the risk of re-
introducing the virus into the live market system. Plastic
poultry cages were introduced for transporting land-based
poultry, and cages that contained poultry from local poul-
try farms or from China were washed in the wholesale
market and then returned to the place of origin. At the
wholesale markets, poultry were sorted according to
weight and transferred to other washed plastic cages and
then transported to the retail poultry markets the next day.
Direct sale of poultry from farms to retail markets was dis-
couraged but continued to occur on a limited basis. Details
of the live poultry marketing system and compliance
requirements imposed by Hong Kong authorities are
described separately (N.Y. Kung et al., unpub. data).
After 1997, the Hong Kong government set up a Farm
Hygiene section under the Agriculture, Fishery, and
Conservation Department for local poultry farm surveil-
lance. This entailed monthly testing for avian influenza
and Newcastle disease viruses, testing for serologic evi-
dence of influenza A (H5), and on-farm monitoring of dis-
ease and production. Discovery of influenza A (H5N1) in
retail poultry markets triggered trace-back, which identi-
fied clinically affected farms and led to intensive on-farm
investigations that identified more infected farms. 
During the 2002 outbreak, clinical disease and
influenza A (H5N1) isolations occurred on 22 of the 146
active chicken farms in Hong Kong. For our study, case
farms were defined as farms that had high death rates
caused by influenza A (H5N1) infection or farms where
influenza A(H5N1) was isolated from chickens during the
outbreak. Each unaffected farm (n = 124) was assigned a
unique identification number, and 46 were selected by
using numbers generated with a random number generator
in Microsoft (Redmond, WA, USA) Excel for Windows.
Data Collection
Data were obtained from the 46 unaffected farms and
16 of the 22 case farms. Representatives (farmers or farm
managers) from 6 case farms and 3 of the selected control
farms were either unavailable or declined to participate in
the study. Subsequently, 3 additional unaffected farms
were selected by using the random number method to yield
the final total of 46 control farms. 
Most chickens raised in Hong Kong were sold through
1 wholesale market and distributed from there to retail live
poultry markets located throughout Hong Kong. However,
some farms also had direct arrangements with retail mar-
ket stall holders. These chicken farms were concentrated in
several areas in the New Territories: Kam Tin, Pak Sha, Ha
Tsuen, San Tin, Ngau Tam Mei, and Ta Kwu Ling. The
affected farms were clustered in 3 areas: Kam Tin (n = 17),
Hung Shui Kiu (n = 1), and Pak Sha (n = 4). Control farms
were located in different areas of the New Territories; how-
ever, none were in Kam Tin because all the chickens in this
region were quarantined and then slaughtered during the
January–February 2002 outbreak.
Survey Methods
We pretested our questionnaire (available from the
principal author on request) on 5 chicken farms, then con-
ducted all study interviews during March 2002. The online
Appendix Table (available from www.cdc.gov/EID/
content/13/3/412-appT.htm) shows the list of potential risk
factors surveyed by the questionnaire. Data on geographic
location, farm characteristics, stock information, flock
health history, farm biosecurity, farm management, and
marketing practices were collected by trained interviewers
during farm visits. Additional information such as farm
area, number of sheds, and incoming day-old chick num-
bers were obtained from official records held by the
Department of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Conservation
and used to validate the information collected during on-
farm interviews. The questionnaire contained 62 closed
and 26 open-ended questions. Of the 88 questions, 77
offered single value and 11 offered multiple value answers.
Virus Isolation, Subtyping, and Genotyping
Cloacal swab samples were collected from both dead
and apparently healthy chickens on farms and tested by
using standard procedures for virus isolation (3). All
influenza virus isolates were subtyped by hemagglutina-
tion and neuraminidase inhibition tests by using specific
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tion–PCR specific for influenza A (H5N1). Genetic
sequencing and phylogenetic analysis were completed on
selected virus isolates (9). 
Spatial Analysis
Global positioning system coordinates for all chicken
farms in Hong Kong were obtained and entered into a dig-
itized map (Land Information Centre, Survey and Mapping
Office, Land Department, Government of Hong Kong) by
using a geographic information system program (ArcView
3.1, Environmental Systems Research Institute, Redlands,
CA, USA). Coordinates were converted where necessary
from latitude and longitude form to map grid on a Hong
Kong 80-data format (Survey and Mapping Office, Land
Department, Government of Hong Kong) (11) to allow for
digital mapping and calculation of distances (Figure).
Statistical Procedures
We entered data into a customized database
(Microsoft Access 2000) and then transferred it into a sta-
tistical package for analysis (SPSS for Windows version
11.0, SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL, USA). We then used descrip-
tive statistics to calculate distributions of all variables by
case and control status. We conducted univariate analyses
to test for associations between disease status and each
explanatory variable by using t tests for continuous vari-
ables and χ2 tests for categorical variables. Where appro-
priate, we categorized responses before analysis, with
categories selected on the basis of the distribution of
responses for that variable. 
Variables from the univariate analyses with a p value
<0.25 were retained for consideration in a multivariate sta-
tistical model. Multivariate logistic regression analysis was
then used to assess associations between independent vari-
ables and the outcome of interest (case or control status),
while controlling for other possible risk factors. We con-
structed the final model by using both forward and back-
ward stepwise procedures. We also used an adapted “best
subsets” approach, by which variables of particular interest
were forced into the initial equation and the influence of
key variables was tested by using the fit of various possible
equations. We then assessed model fit by using the Hosmer-
Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test (12) and the ratio of the
deviance to the degrees of freedom. Adjusted odds ratios
(ORs) and their 95% confidence intervals were calculated.
In all tests, a p value <0.05 was considered significant.
Results
Temporal and Spatial Pattern of Genotypes
The Figure shows the locations of the 22 infected
farms (16 case-control study and 6 nonparticipant farms),
46 control farms, and 78 other unaffected farms. Three dif-
ferent genotypes of influenza A(H5N1) were identified: 13
case farms were infected with genotype Z, 8 with genotype
Y, and 1 with genotype X (Table 1). The spatial pattern
showed strong clustering of genotypes Z and Y, with some
outliers. The 1 farm infected with genotype X was physi-
cally separate from the other 2 clusters. At the time of the
outbreak, genotypes Y, Z, and X were isolated from poul-
try farms, while genotypes Z, B, X0, X1, X2, and X3 were
detected in live poultry markets. Genotype Y was found
only on chicken farms (9,13).
Risk Factors for Infection of Farms
Univariate Analysis
Statistical comparisons were not done for 9 of the
variables from the questionnaire because of either unifor-
mity of response across all farms or excessive missing
data. Summary information for farm area, stock numbers,
and shed numbers on each farm are presented in Table 2.
We performed χ2 tests of association on 60 variables in the
univariate analysis. Table 3 shows the variables that were
associated with a p value <0.25 in the univariate analysis.
Affected farms were concentrated in a small number of
districts compared with controls, which were more widely
distributed across districts (OR 123.0, p<0.01). 
Other factors positively associated with case farms:
number of chickens on farm; stock density; death rate
higher for birds >30 days of age than for younger birds
(OR 7.40, p = 0.02); survival rate at 1–30 days of age (OR
1.54, p<0.01); medication use during January–February
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Figure. Map of Hong Kong showing the locations of the 22 infect-
ed farms (16 case-control study and 6 nonparticipant farms), 46
control farms, and 78 other unaffected farms active during the
2002 outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza A virus (sub-
type H5N1).2002 (OR 4.67, p = 0.02); whether chickens were sold
directly to retail markets (OR 11.15, p<0.01); whether
automatic manure scrapers were installed (OR 4.55, p =
0.02); whether persons from retail markets visited during
January–February 2002 (OR 10.00, p = 0.01); and whether
a visitor went inside the shed during this period (OR 3.94,
p = 0.04). Factors that had ORs significantly <1.0 for case
farms were reports of wild birds eating in the chicken feed
trough (OR 0.20, p = 0.04), farm owner living on farm (OR
0.05, p<0.01), and visitors from another chicken farm dur-
ing January–February 2002 (OR 0.23, p = 0.02).
Multivariate Analysis
Three alternative final models were identified from
the model-building procedures, each containing variables
that had significant p values (Table 4). Three variables
appeared in all models: owner lives off farm, age group
with highest death rate at >30 days old, and sale of chick-
ens direct to retail markets. Each model had 1 additional
variable, which was different for the 3 models; wild birds
in feed trough (protective, model A), number of chickens
on farm (model B), and relative working in poultry indus-
try (model C). On the basis of the Hosmer-Lemeshow sta-
tistic, model A provided the best fit to the data, while by
the adjusted R2 statistic, model B had the highest explana-
tory value. In this model, farms with a nonresident owner
were 12.8× more likely to be a case farm; farms that sold
chicken directly to retail markets were 30.3× more likely
to be a case farm; farms with highest death rate in birds
>30 days old were 20.5× more likely to be a case farm; and
farms with higher chicken numbers were 1.1× more likely
to be a case farm. 
Residual components from all 3 models showed 1
farm (Farm ID 19) with a large standardized residual. This
was a farm in Pak Sha area where influenza A(H5N1) was
isolated on February 20, 2002, but the model predicted it
would be a control farm. Farm 19 imported day-old chicks
from China during mid-February and sold some chicks 10
days later to another nearby farm (case farm, Farm ID 20).
Infection may have entered this farm directly with import-
ed birds; therefore, it did not share risk factors with the
other case farms.
Discussion
We describe the use of a combination of descriptive
and analytic epidemiologic techniques to investigate pos-
sible risk factors associated with the 2002 influenza A
(H5N1) outbreak in Hong Kong. The small sample size
limited the number of risk factors we could combine in a
multivariable model and prevented consideration of inter-
action terms. Models containing >4 variables and models
containing interaction terms either did not converge or
showed evidence of multicollinearity. Inspection of counts
for combinations of explanatory variables indicated that
these occurrences were likely to be the result of zero
counts. Because the study included only 16 case farms and
related directly to transmission processes that exposed
these specific farms, our inferences apply only to the spe-
cific circumstances of this outbreak, and caution should be
used in applying these findings to other situations. 
Comparison of the clusters of case farms with the spa-
tial distribution of randomly selected control farms indi-
cated strongly that locally operating contagious risk
factors had a strong influence on which farms become
infected. That is, either the virus was spread between farms
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infection.
Many of the commercial chicken farms in Hong Kong
operate as small, family-run businesses and are located in
close proximity to each other. Some larger scale commer-
cial chicken farms (concentrated in the Kam Tin area)
operate with modern facilities such as automatic manure
scrapers, drink dispensers, and feeders. On all of these
farms except 1, chickens are raised in 3- to 4-tier cages
located in open-sided sheds with fan-assisted ventilation.
These farms also use a “continuous flow of stock” opera-
tion, which means they contain different age groups of
chickens at any 1 time. 
Only 1 chicken farm in Hong Kong at the time of the
2002 outbreak operated on an “all-in, all-out” basis, with
≈9,000 chickens at same age group raised in 2 levels of
open (not individual), net wire–fenced area. Consequently,
this farm had less contact with markets and enhanced
biosecurity compared with other case farms. A notable
point is that this farm was the only case farm located out-
side the main affected district and the only farm where the
X genotype was isolated during the 2002 outbreak. Joint
interpretation of the epidemiologic investigation findings
and gene sequence results shows that the disease apparent-
ly entered a small number of chicken farms as a single
transmission event and then either was controlled on that
farm (the geographically isolated farm affected by geno-
type X) or spread laterally to farms that shared local expo-
sure factors (farms clustered in certain areas affected by
genotypes Y and Z).
Visits to a farm by >1 persons from retail markets was
a strong risk factor for infection. This supports the hypoth-
esis that infection began in the retail markets, where local-
ly produced and imported poultry were mixed and kept for
several days (14). A US study showed that avian influenza
virus (subtype H5N2) amplified in the retail poultry mar-
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that “rest days,” when markets are emptied of all poultry
and cleaned, can interrupt virus perpetuation (16,17).
Therefore, influenza A (H5N1) introduced into poultry
markets in 2002 likely was amplified within them and
transmitted back to a few index farms, initiating each
genotype-specific outbreak. Each genotype then spread to
other farms (Y, Z) or remained limited to the index farm
(X), depending on the proximity and operation design of
the farm. The virus may also have been carried among
farms by retail poultry market personnel who visited mul-
tiple farms. 
Factors that require particular attention in risk man-
agement include movement of humans (e.g., buyers, bird
catchers) and inanimate objects (e.g., cages, trucks)
between retail markets and farms, or among multiple
farms, because these movements may carry virus in ways
that expose birds to an infectious dose. Airborne spread
from affected birds, either while infection was spreading
within a flock or during slaughter of a flock, may explain
a small number of cases (especially those associated with
the Y genotype), but most secondary cases appeared to be
due to transfer of virus between farms in ways that could
be prevented with enhanced biosecurity. 
In addition, influenza A (H5N1) has been isolated
from terrestrial birds (13,18,19), which raised the concern
that local resident wild birds could introduce virus into a
flock. However, although the presence of wild birds in the
vicinity of the chicken farms was considered a possible
risk factor for introducing avian influenza, it was not sig-
nificant in this analysis. In fact, wild birds being observed
in feed troughs was a protective factor for infection cases
in both univariate and multivariate analyses. This informa-
tion should be interpreted with caution, however, because
the operators of case farms underwent questioning by gov-
ernment field officers after the farm was identified as
infected and thus may have been more aware of the possi-
bility of transmission of avian influenza from wild birds.
This may have decreased the frequency with which case
farms reported of the presence of wild birds in feed troughs
in case farms compared with control farms.
The death rate in chickens >30 days old was higher on
case farms than on control farms, which is to be expected
because avian influenza kills chickens of all ages and will
increase the death rate in older age groups. In addition,
chickens in this age group were more likely to be visited
by the stock agents, catchers, or farmers before being sent
to the markets. Notably, all 3 models showed that the
owner living off the farm was a significant risk factor.
These farms may have outside visitors, or the owners may
be more likely to employ nonfamily workers, and this
increased activity increases the likelihood that the virus
will be brought onto the farm. Owners who live on the
farm may also be more attentive to implementation of pro-
tective measures.
The evidence from this study points toward influenza
A(H5N1) moving from retail markets to farms for each of
the genotype-specific outbreaks. Genotype Y was not iso-
lated from retail poultry market samples at the time of the
outbreaks, likely because of the relatively small numbers
of live poultry markets that were under routine virologic
surveillance at that time. However, we cannot rule out the
possibility of an alternative route of introduction of this
genotype into the farms, e.g., through wild birds or smug-
gled poultry.
Enhancement of farm biosecurity would be a useful
measure to reduce entry of virus onto farms and interfarm
spread. Good farm management and strict biosecurity
measures are beneficial actions available to prevent entry
of infection to farms and transmission between sheds with-
in farms (e.g., only allowing authorized persons to enter
the farm, providing a change of clothes and footwear for
all visitors, requiring a stand-down period for anyone who
had been in retail poultry markets, ensuring strict control
of equipment and transport vehicles entering farms). The
role of live poultry markets in the amplification and dis-
semination of influenza viruses is likely to be related to the
maintenance of HPAI (H5N1) across Asia, where such live
poultry markets serve the demand for the consumption of
freshly killed poultry. One way of reducing the risks asso-
ciated with live poultry marketing is to reduce the levels of
virus circulating in these markets, which has been
achieved in Hong Kong through a combination of compul-
sory vaccination and strict biosecurity measures on poultry
farms.
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